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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Karl Richardson appeals from his judgment and conviction for one count of grand theft

following a jury

Statement
In

trial.

Of The

And Course Of The Proceedings

Facts

September of 2017, Jeff Majors went

discovered his pontoon boat and

trailer,

(5/8/19 Tr., p.53, Ls.4-7; p.57, L.7

stolen. (5/8/19 Tr., p.61,

A

state

p.61, L.4.)

He and

The tape showed

area.

his Wife called police

that

on September 24, 2017,

was

to the Majors’ boat,” the drivers

it.

that

around 9:00 a.m., a

an individual named Bill Morgan “took

Morgan

“When he bought

Tr., p.97,

and parked

maroon truck “backed up

[a]

motor

number 0n

in to

told police he “didn’t

the boat motor, that

know

at the

ﬁrst with

Canyon Marina”

the motor, an

“had been stolen,” and called Jeff Majors and the police. (5/8/19

p.229, L.4.) Bill

lot.

(5/8/19 Tr., p.241, Ls.16-19.)

for repair. (5/10/19 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-4.) After checking a serial

it

at

The maroon-colored truck then “pulled out

the pontoon boat and left,” With the black vehicle behind

18,

it

of both vehicles got out and “hooked up the boat” t0 the truck.

(5/8/19 Tr., p.98, Ls.3-9; p.241, Ls.5-16.)

determined

and reported

also a “maroon-colored” truck that drove through

(5/8/19 Tr., p.97, Ls.14-15; State’s EX.6.) After the

October

and

had gone missing.

kind of in front of” Jeff Majors’ pontoon boat. (5/8/19

Ls. 1 8-19; State’s EX. 6.) There

On

there,

park employee reviewed surveillance footage from the marina parking

“black vehicle was parked

same

Which he had previously parked

lot

L.14 — p.62, L6.)

(5/8/19 Tr., p.87, Ls.4-10.)

in the

—

Marina parking

t0 the Spring Shores

Tr.,

employee

p.228, L. 12

—

time that the motor was stolen,” and

two people brought

it

two him”: Richardson, and a

“guy by the name of Gino,” Who was also known as Eugene
14; 5/10/19 Tr., p.57, L.21

Thereafter,

who

(5/8/19 Tr., p.223, Ls.13-

—p.58, L3.)

0n October 23, Richardson went

what remained of Majors’ “pontoon boat With
Richardson,

Carroll.

drove a maroon colored truck

t0 the

Nampa

his truck.”

Police Department, “pulling”

(5/10/19 TL, p.55, L.2

(ﬂ Def. EX. D;

—

p.56, L5.)

5/8/19 Tr., p.202, L.18

— p.203,

L.13), told police he “bargained, traded, [and] did things” in exchange for the pontoon, and

“didn’t

know

it

was

stolen.” (5/10/19 Tr., p.57, Ls.6-8).

he named Eugene Carroll. (5/10/19

The

state

When

asked

Who he

got the boat from,

Tr., p.57, Ls.8-9.)

charged Richardson with one count 0f grand

theft, alleging that,

0n September

24, 2017, Richardson “did wrongfully take, obtain, and/or withhold a boat trailer, pontoon boat,

state additionally

(R., pp.42-43.)

The

persistent Violator.

(R.,

from the owner, Jeff Majors.”

and 150 H. Mercury outboard boat engine
ﬁled an information part

II,

alleging Richardson

was a

pp.93-94.)

At

trial,

Who watched
format

(ﬂ

the state called Jeff Majors to testify, as well as the park

Although the

the surveillance footage.

entire Video

employee and detective

was n0 longer

State’s EX. 6), both Witnesses testiﬁed that the footage they

reviewed showed the

maroon-colored (or “brownish”) truck “hooked 0n the pontoon boat.” (5/8/19
p.241, Ls.16-19; 5/10/19 Tr., p.39, L.2

from Richardson
p.193, L.24

bringing

— p.196,

some

testiﬁed that

driving his

to a friend,

—

p.40,

L23.) The

timestamped shortly

L.3; State’s EX.9.)

after 9:00

state additionally

on the day of the

Tr., p.98, Ls.5-9;

played a voicemail

theft.

(5/8/19 Tr.,

In the voicemail Richardson tells his friend that he

carpet over t0 her, but “nothing illegal.”

When Richardson

in a playable

(State’s EX. 10.)

That same friend

arrived that day, “[s]ometime between 10 and 10:30,” he

truck—which she deemed a “[b]urgundy, maroon” color—and

that

is

was

he had a pontoon

boat.

— p.198,

(5/8/19 TL, p.197, L.12

Carroll,

who

She testiﬁed

L.19.)

that Richardson, along With

arrived “probably around an hour” later, proceeded t0

work on the

Eugene

boat, “focused

on

the motor.” (5/8/19 T11, p.200, Ls.7-18.)

The

state also called

theft in connection

Eugene Carroll

with the pontoon

(5/8/19 T11, p.162, L.21

— p.163,

theft,

L.12.)

He

t0 testify.

and had since pleaded guilty as part of a plea
testiﬁed that he

September With Richardson, Who was driving
L.25 — p.146, L.1.)

were supposed
Ls.19-24.)

to

had also been charged With grand

Carroll

his

went out

“maroon—ish colored” truck. (5/8/19

Carroll testiﬁed that Richardson had asked

be taking

this

to Spring Shores

him

Carroll additionally testiﬁed that the

maroon truck

Marina
Tr.,

for help, telling

boat out 0f drydock to do some work 0n

it.”

deal.

in

p.144,

him “we

(5/8/19 T11, p.147,

in the surveillance footage

was

Richardson’s; that Richardson “installed” the pontoon to the truck hitch; and “[t]hen he took

0f

.”

didn’t

(5/8/19 T11, p.151, Ls.9-19; p.153, L.23

know we were

—

p.154, L.6.)

stealing the boat for the ﬁrst time until”

Carroll,

Who

maintained that “I

he got t0 Richardson’s friend’s

house, testiﬁed that at that point Richardson “was already over there taking the engine off.”

(5/8/19 Tr., p.155, L.6

On

— p.157,

the third day of

L.4.)

trial,

the state called the detective

Who

interviewed Richardson,

testiﬁed as follows:

And

Q

A11 right.

A

Yes,

Q.

Did you Mirandize him?

A

Yes.

Q

Why?

I

did you have a conversation With Mr. Richardson?

did.

Who

had become aware that he had a warrant for his arrest for an
unrelated incident. So I was aware that I going [sic] t0 be taking him into
So I just simply wanted to
custody at the end 0f our conversation.
Because

A.

I

Mirandize him so there wasn’t any issues With
(5/10/19 Tr., p.74, L.21

— p.75,

L.8.)

Shortly afterwards, Richardson’s attorney

jury.

(5/10/19 Tr., p.76, L.8

to the jury that

—

he Mirandized

p.80,

my

moved

for a mistrial outside the presence of the

L3.) Trial counsel argued

client in his interview

and was “a completely separate incident.” (5/10/19

that this information

that “[t]he detective just testiﬁed

because he knew he had a warrant out

which “has nothing

for his arrest in an unrelated incident,”

case,

that.

t0

do With” the

arrest warrant in this

She further argued

Tr., p.77, Ls.9-17.)

was “extremely prejudicial,” had “n0 probative value whatsoever,” and was

“not something that [the jury] can just forget about through the course 0f this

trial.”

(5/10/19 T11,

p.78, Ls.1-12.) Finally, counsel argued that “I don’t even think that a limiting instruction

help

at this

point because, now, in their minds,

(5/10/19 Tr., p.79, Ls.17-20.)

noting that if

it

The

district court

“den[ied] the motion,

I

would

all

they

know

is

that

he had an

would

arrest warrant.”

reserved ruling on the motion until later in

at least

want

trial,

t0 give a limiting instruction t0 the

jury.” (5/10/19 Tr., p.80, Ls.16-22.)

Prior t0 the start 0f the fourth day 0f

(5/14/19 TL, p.5, L.16

—

p.7, L.12.)

trial,

the district court ruled

0n the

mistrial motion.

Citing State V. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476

(2008), the court concluded the evidence of Richardson’s outstanding arrest warrant

“offered t0 prove the defendant’s criminal character or criminal propensity but

more so

the police ofﬁcer’s actions at the time” 0f the interview. (5/14/19 Tr., p.5, L.17

— p.6,

was not

to explain

L.1

1.)

The

court found the “prosecutor wasn’t intending to elicit the evidence 0r testimony,” and in any

event, “the evidence really

the circumstances

it

had minimal relevance, had minimal probative value,” but also “under

had minimal prejudicial

effect.” (5/14/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.1 1-20.)

Turning to a potential limiting instruction, the
give” one.

instruction

(5/14/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.21-23.)

might actually cause the jury

district court indicated

it

The court was aware, though,

to think about

“still

p1an[ned] t0

that “a limiting

something that they probably won’t think

about anyhow,” Which meant the defense might “not want a limiting instruction so as t0 forego
ringing that bell a second time.” (5/14/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-8.)

The court thus

“[left] that t0

counsel

to think about.” (5/14/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.8-10.)

After both sides rested, and following an in—chambers conference, the district court

proposed jury instruction

18, regarding the arrest warrant:

During the course of the
an outstanding

trial,

you heard testimony from an ofﬁcer

arrest warrant for the defendant.

appear for a minor trafﬁc offense and

was given merely
consider

it

is

[I]t

that referenced

[i]nvolved his failure to

irrelevant to the matter set before you.

t0 explain the ofﬁcer’s actions at the time.

as evidence 0f guilt in this case

and

it

You

It

are not to

should not be mentioned or

considered in your deliberations.
(5/14/19 Tr., p.36, Ls.4-13.) Neither party objected to the limiting instruction (5/14/19 Tr., p.24,
Ls.10-15), and Richardson’s attorney placed his approval 0f the instruction 0n the record:

[Y]our honor,

N0.

I

would

like t0 state, for the record, that regarding instruction

18, the limiting instruction,

mistrial

was denied,

I’ve

due

spoken With

t0 the fact that

my client

my

Rule 29 motion for a

about the limiting instruction and

we have

decided t0 include that limiting instruction, instead of not instructing jury
on that statement made by that detective. So the included instruction, N0.
is ﬁne With the defense based on the denial 0f the Rule 29 motion.

[sic]

18,

(5/14/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-24.)

The jury found Richardson
(R., pp.143-44.)

guilty 0f grand theft

and the persistent Violator enhancement.

Richardson subsequently ﬁled a Rule 35 motion for a

new

trial,

“made

for the

reason that “Defendant’s Motion for Mistrial pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal Rule 29 was denied
during

trial.”

It is

(R., p. 148.)

The

district court, ruling

on the motion, found the following:

undisputed that the State did not intentionally

elicit

the improper testimony

concerning the Defendant’s outstanding arrest warrant. The statement was not

meant

actions.

The

show any criminal propensity, but rather to explain the Detective’s
There was n0 testimony as to the nature 0f the outstanding arrest warrant.

t0

State did not encourage 0r invite the jury t0

statement. After the Detective
that

it

made

the improper

draw any inferences from this
comment, the Court indicated

would give a curative instruction, and the Defendant consented t0
No. 18, which explained the improper statement and directed the jury
consider it in their deliberations. The Court presumes the jury followed the

Instruction

not to

Court’s instructions.

Any

delay in instructing the jury was harmless as the jury was given a written

curative instruction, and there
instruction or

is

n0 reason

to believe the jury ignored this

drew impermissible inferences of

guilt.

In reviewing the entire

course of proceedings, the Court concludes that the statement did not affect the

outcome of the

case,

and any impact

it

may have had 0n

the proceedings

was

harmless, given the weight of the evidence against the Defendant.

(R., p.162.)

The

The court accordingly denied Richardson’s motion
district court

for a

new trial.

(Id.)

sentenced Richardson t0 15 years, With three years ﬁxed.

Richardson timely appealed.

(R., pp.172-75.)

(R., p.167.)

ISSUES
Richardson

states the issues

Did

I.

on appeal

the District Court err

as:

by denying

the Defendant’s

Mistrial after the State elicited testimony

on

direct

Motion

for a

examination of an

outstanding warrant for the Defendant’s arrest?

Did

II.

the State

commit

prosecutorial misconduct

by appealing t0 the passion
members by emphasizing the Victim’s loss of
0f Which was not charged in the Information?

and/or prejudices 0f the jury
sentimental items the theft

Did the

III.

District Court err

by denying

the Defendant’s

Motion

for

New

Trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Richardson

failed to

show

the district court erred

by denying

his

motion for a

mistrial?

II.

Has Richardson
erroneous,

show

failed t0

much

less

that

the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were even

they

amounted

t0

fundamental

error

0r

prosecutorial

misconduct?

III.

Has Richardson
trial?

failed t0

show

the district court erred

by denying

his

motion for a new

ARGUMENT
I.

Richardson Fails To
A.

Show The

District Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion For A Mistrial

Introduction

Richardson claims the

district court

should have granted his motion for a mistrial after the

jury heard testimony about Richardson’s then—outstanding arrest warrant for an unrelated offense.

Richardson also claims, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, that the

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

court erred

by not immediately

striking the evidence or

district

immediately giving a limiting instruction.

(Appellant’s brief, p5.)

These arguments

fail.

The

evidence, while minimally relevant,

time” of the interview.

district court correctly

was admissible

concluded that the arrest warrant

“t0 explain the police ofﬁcer’s actions at the

(5/14/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-11.)

Alternatively, even if the arrest warrant

information was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless, and was nothing near good cause

t0 declare a mistrial.

Furthermore, Richardson never

moved below

asked for an immediate limiting instruction, and
instruction.

t0 strike the ofﬁcer’s statement,

initially indicated

he would not want a limiting

Thus, his newfound claims 0n appeal—that the statement should have been

immediately struck and an instruction immediately given—are not preserved.
these claims

fail

0n the

merits, because Richardson fails t0

show any

error based

In any event,

on the court’s

purported failures t0 strike the evidence and immediately issue a limiting instruction.

B.

never

Standard

Of Review

The standard of review

for a denial 0f a

motion for

mistrial is well established:

[T]he question on appeal

is

not Whether the

discretion in light of circumstances existing

judge reasonably exercised his

trial

When

the mistrial motion

was made.

Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error

When Viewed

in the context

of the

full record.

Thus, Where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse

The standard, more accurately stated, is one
of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s reﬁlsal t0 declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, Viewed retrospectively, constituted
0f discretion” standard

is

a misnomer.

reversible error.

State V. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68,

253 P.3d 727, 742 (201

1)

(quoting State V. Field, 144 Idaho

559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)).

C.

The

District Court Correctly

Denied Richardson’s Motion For

Was Admissible Evidence,
Evidence Did Not Create An Unfair Trial

Arrest Warrant Statement
Into

“A

mistrial

may be

declared,

legal defect during the trial

fair trial.”

Which

is

upon

A

fair trial,

however,

132-33

(1986)).

“not necessarily a perfect

Consequently,

Its

“[t]he

and deprives the defendant of a

930 P.2d 1039, 1045

Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (citing State
128,

Or, Alternatively,

prejudicial t0 the defendant

is

The
Admission

Mistrial Because

the defendant’s motion, if there has been an error or

State V. D0912, 129 Idaho 597, 603,

I.C.R. 29.1.)

A

V. Estes,

admission

trial.”

(Ct.

E

App. 1996)

(citing

State V. Field, 144

111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d

of improper evidence

does

not

automatically require the declaration of a mistrial.” State V. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198

P.3d 128, 136

(Ct.

App. 2008).

Here, the district court correctly concluded that the arrest warrant testimony was
admissible under State V. Yakovac. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel was
not ineffective for discussing, and not objecting

t0,

warrant testimony—because “the warrants

were admissiblefor the limitedpurpose ofexplaining Yakovac ’s arrest and subsequent search 0f
her truck.”

Li. at 487,

180 P.3d

at

448 (emphasis added).

That was exactly What the

district

court concluded about the arrest warrant testimony here; that

was offered not

it

more so

[Richardson’s] criminal character or criminal propensity but

ofﬁcer’s actions” in giving Richardson “the Miranda warnings.”

And

to

“prove

t0 explain the police

(5/14/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-15.)

While the state acknowledges that a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court recently called

Yakovac

into question,

ﬂ

State V. Jones,

No. 45905, 2020

2020), Yakovac has not been overruled and

is still

WL 21

1

1375, at *12 (Idaho

binding precedent.

Thus, the

May 4,

district court’s

straightforward application 0f Yakovac, and conclusion that the arrest warrant testimony

was

admissible to explain the police ofﬁcer’s actions, was correct.

Alternatively,

Richardson

t0

fails

show

that the

erroneously admitted—was cause t0 grant a mistrial. There

arrest

is

warrant testimony—even

n0 evidence

in the record

the detective’s single statement about the arrest warrant deprived Richardson of a fair

is

especially true in light of the limiting instruction,

minor trafﬁc offense”; was “irrelevant

t0 the matter set before you”;

explain the ofﬁcer’s actions at the time”; that the jury
in this case”;

and

that “it should not

TL, p.36, Ls.4-13.)

We

Which told the jury the

was “not

arrest

showing

trial.

was

This
“for a

“was given merely

to consider

it

to

as evidence of guilt

be mentioned or considered in your deliberations.”

“presume[] the jury followed” these instructions.

if

(5/ 14/ 19

State V. Miller, 165

Idaho 115, 122, 443 P.3d 129, 136 (2019).
In addition t0 the curative instruction, the state

state’s

that

evidence included,

was

among

had a strong case against Richardson. The

other things: the surveillance Video, Which

the spitting image 0f Richardson’s truck—driving

up

to the

showed a truck—

pontoon boat

(State’s EX. 6;

Def’ s EX. D); testimony from two people that watched the entire surveillance Video and reported

it

showed

the truck “hooking up” t0 the pontoon and driving

p.241, Ls.16-19; 5/10/19 Tr., p.39, L.2

—

p.40,

away

(5/8/19 TL, p.98, Ls.5-9;

L23); testimony from Richardson’s accomplice,

10

Who

how he and

explained

Richardson

stole the boat (5/8/19 Tr., p.151, Ls.9-19; p.153, L.23

p.154, L6); and testimony that Richardson himself returned the stolen pontoon to the
Police Department (5/10/19 Tr., p.55, L.2

On the
As

— p.56,

“minimal prejudicial

it,

would have been minimal.

the arrest warrant testimony

had both “minimal relevance” and

(5/14/19 T11, p.6, Ls.16-20.)

Furthermore, neither the prosecutor

effect.”

nor any 0f the Witnesses ever mentioned the arrest warrant again

which likewise minimized

5/14/Tr.),

Nampa

L.5).

other side of the ledger, the probative force 0f any error

the district court put

—

its

(ﬂ

generally 5/10/19 TL;

probative effect and potential prejudice.

Because the

weight of the arrest warrant testimony came nowhere near the risk of potential unfair prejudice

from the challenged evidence, the
instruction,

On
court.

Richardson could

appeal, Richardson

Instead,

receive a fair

did not err by concluding that, With a curative

trial.

makes n0 attempt

t0

meet

his

burden 0f showing error by the

he simply proclaims, in conclusory fashion, that “[t]here

beyond a reasonable doubt,
warrants

still

district court

that the

is

no way

trial

conclude

to

improper admission of testimony concerning unrelated

and the Defendant’s imminent

arrest

Without a prompt curative instruction in

conjunction With disclosing the reason for the arrest warrant in closing jury instructions did not
contribute to the Defendant’s conviction in this case.”

is

not entitled t0 a presumption that the district court erred in

Before an error

Pe_n'y,

to,

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) But Richardson

is

its

ruling

on

m

his mistrial motion.

reviewed for harmlessness the appellant must show judicial

error.

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010) (“A defendant appealing from an objected-

non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty t0 establish that such an error occurred, at

which point the

State shall

have the burden of demonstrating

reasonable doubt”); see also Garcia

V.

that the error is harmless

beyond a

Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898, 899, 174 P.3d 868, 869 (2007)
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(the appellant has the

failed to

show

burden of afﬁrmatively showing error on the record).

that the district court

Because Richardson

fails

abused

to

its

show

getting a fair trial in light 0f the evidence

discretion

by denying

Richardson has

his mistrial motion.

the arrest warrant testimony prevented

him from

show

the district

and the curative

instruction,

he

fails t0

court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.

D.

Claims That The District Court Should Have Struck The Ofﬁcer’s

Richardson’s

Or Immediately Given
They Fail On The Merits

Statement

A

Limiting

Instruction

Are

Not

Preserved;

Alternatively,

Richard also claims on appeal that the

district court

should have “promptly [struck] the

evidence” and “promptly give[n] a curative instruction.” (Appellant’s

With these claims

is

who

Below, Richardson never moved

that they are unpreserved.

arrest warrant testimony.

(E 5/10/19 TL, p.77, L.7 — p.80, L3.)

And

(E

5/10/19 TL, p.77, L.7

opposite: that an immediate limiting instruction

—

p.80, L.3.)

would be

futile.

the court that “I don’t even think that a limiting instruction

in [the jurors’] minds, all they

was going

t0 strike the

was only

it

the state

(5/10/19 Tr., p.79,

Richardson never moved for an immediate limiting instruction, or even hinted that

one was necessary.

now,

In fact,

suggested below that the testimony could be struck from the record.

Ls.2-7.)

The problem

brief, p.5.)

t0 arrest

know

is

that

he had an

him n0 matter what happened during

In fact, he suggested the exact

Richardson’s counsel informed

would help

arrest warrant

at this

and

that interview.”

point because,

that this detective

(5/10/19 Tr., p.79,

Ls.17-21.)

It is

well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “Will not consider issues raised for the ﬁrst

time on appeal.”

State V. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)

(quoting Mickelsen Const., Inc. V. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 212 (2013)).
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“Issues not raised

below

Will not be considered

this court

by

on appeal, and the

held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”

Ranches,

Inc. V. State,

546-47 (1979)).
instruction should

BV & Through Dep’t of Pub.

Li

parties Will

be

Heckman

(citing

Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799-800, 589 P.2d 540,

Below Richardson never made

a motion t0 strike, or argued that a curative

(ﬂ

5/10/19 Tr.; 5/14/19 TL), so these claims are

have been promptly given

accordingly not preserved.
Alternatively, Richardson fails t0

limiting instruction,

failure t0 strike the

show any

error

0n the

merits.

In light 0f the jury’s

which we presume the jury followed, Richardson does not show
testimony

made any

difference.

that the

Similarly, other than complaining that the

jury had “four days t0 View testimony through a tainted lens” (Appellant’s brief, p.6), Richardson

fails to

explain

how

giving the limiting instruction sooner

verdict, insofar as the jury

was ultimately properly

would have made any

difference t0 the

instructed.

Richardson makes a curious complaint about the text of the jury instruction.

He

points

out the instruction told the jury “that the Defendant failed to appear 0n a minor trafﬁc offense
resulting in his arrest,” which, he thinks, “paints the picture 0f a Defendant

breaks the law and

This argument

fails to

fails, ﬁrst,

appear in court, even for minor offenses.”

who

historically

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

because Richardson stipulated t0 the text 0f the jury instruction. Trial

counsel told the court that she and Richardson “decided t0 include” the instruction, as written,

Without objection.

(5/14/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-22.)

Thus, Richardson “invite[d] the court t0 give

the challenged instruction[],” as opposed to merely not objecting t0

claim the text 0f the instruction amounted t0

error.

it;

as such, he cannot

State V. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240,

985 P.2d

117, 120 (1999); State V. Grifﬁth, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986).
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now

More

fundamentally, Richardson’s gripe—that the jury instruction improperly explained

why Richardson had an

arrest

a car over the speed limit at

sorts

0f reasons.

warrant—goes against

some

point,

all

common

Every driver has driven

and many people have missed court appearances for

What the warrant was

As

concluding the worst.
below.

She lamented

ticket,

but thejury doesn

it

for,

know

completely neutralizes

it.

On

the other hand, if the jury

was not

could reasonably worry about the jury speculating and

happens, this

that, “[i]t

’t

we

is

precisely

What Richardson’s counsel worried about

could have been warrant for something as small as a trafﬁc

that.” (5/14/19 Tr., p.79,

a sensible concern, and explaining the warrant

was

Ls.15-17 (emphasis added).) This was

“for something as small as a trafﬁc ticket”

Richardson cannot reverse course

now and

argue that instruction told

the jury too much, or seriously complain that, after the jury heard about his

infraction, they

all

Thus, noting that Richardson’s arrest warrant was for a minor trafﬁc citation

explains the warrant in the most benign, innocuous way.

told

sense.

must have concluded he was a career

criminal.

minor trafﬁc

In sum, even if preserved,

Richardson’s complaints about the jury instruction, and any failure to strike the warrant
testimony,

fail

0n the

merits.

II.

Richardson Fails To

Much Less
A.

Show The

Prosecutor’s Statements In Closing

Argument Were Erroneous,

That They Amounted To Fundamental Error Or Prosecutorial Misconduct

Introduction

Richardson claims, for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, that the prosecutor committed misconduct
in his closing

argument by “appealing

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) But he fails t0

to the passion and/or prejudices

show

that these

14

of the jury members.”

comments, which he had no objection

to

below, were even improper—much less that they amounted t0 fundamental

error, 0r prosecutorial

misconduct.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Absent a timely objection below,

this

Court Will only review an alleged

trial

error under

the fundamental error doctrine. State V. Per_ry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

C.

Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right, Clear On The Record,
He Therefore Fails T0 Show That The Prosecutor’s Statements
Rose To The Level Of Fundamental Error
Richardson Fails T0
That

Was Not

Harmless;

For the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, Richardson claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by

“by appealing
loss

t0 the passion and/or prejudices

of sentimental items the theft of which was not charged in the Information.” (Appellant’s
(emphasis altered).)

brief, p.7

objection below he

245 P.3d

at 978.

unwaived
Li.

of the jury members by emphasizing the Victim’s

is

Because he did not preserve

required to

show fundamental

T0 show fundamental

constitutional rights

error

error the appellant

were violated.”

Li.

this

0n appeal.

newfound claim With an

m,

must ﬁrst show

150 Idaho

that

at

226,

“one or more

Second, “the error must be clear or obvious.”

“This means the record must contain evidence 0f the error and the record must also contain

evidence as t0 whether or not

165 Idaho

at 119,

443 P.3d

counsel’s decision

was

trial

counsel

at 133.

made

a tactical decision in failing to object.”

m,

“If the record does not contain evidence regarding Whether

strategic, the

claim

addressed Via a petition for post—conviction

is

factual in nature

relief.”

Li. Finally, the appellant

that the error affected [his or her] substantial rights.” Per_ry,
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and thus more appropriately

150 Idaho

at

“must demonstrate

226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Pig’s

Turning to

amounted

much

to error,

less that his

unwaived

considerable latitude in closing argument and

t0

be drawn from the evidence. State

While “appeals

show

ﬁrst prong, Richardson fails t0

V.

the prosecutor’s

constitutional rights

may

were

violated.

fully discuss the evidence

comments

Parties

have

and the inferences

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003).

to emotion, passion 0r prejudice

of the jury through use of inﬂammatory tactics”

are understandably forbidden, State V. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583,

588

(Ct.

App.

2007), appellate courts Will not “lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark t0

have

most damaging meaning or

its

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, Will

meaning from the plethora 0f less damaging

draw

that

State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,

interpretations.”

719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnellv V. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).

The relevant question
unfairness as to

is

make

therefore “whether the prosecutors’

comments

‘so infected the trial

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” State V. Lankford, 162

Idaho 477, 497, 399 P.3d 804, 824 (2017) (quoting Darden

V.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1 986)).

With those standards
So

in

mind, here

there’s something that keeps

me,

at least.

I

is

what the prosecutor told the jury:

coming up

found

this funnier

for him, but for

knife” on

it,

somebody on

M-Y
the

it

my Wife was my granddad. And maybe

Whatever reason, he gave

And

passed away.

than

0f hits home for
I’m so bad when you bring me on
spreads around. The only person

in this case that kind

am the worst ﬁsherman on earth.

the boat, the boat doesn’t catch any ﬁsh, so
that

me

in solely a reason that a

ﬁshing knife, which

dock Where he leaves

it

as a

little

joke

When he
“my ﬁshing

a pretty nice ﬁshing knife

granddad does, he put

funny
is going

is

Lay’s ﬁshing knife. They’re just going t0 see

to

me

t0

know, 0h,

because

it’s

this is

“my ﬁshing knife.” So

it

not like

Jackson

was meant

for his family that this is not your ﬁshing knife, this is Pop’s ﬁshing knife.

And

it

[sic],

has

all

those things that go along with

you can see

and over again.

was

able to

with

ﬁnd

it,

And

it.

It

has

all

the times he sharped

it

every time he went through and sharpened that blade over
it

has

the exact

all those little pieces and memories t0 it
same ﬁshing knife somewhere else, you

16

that

even

if I

can’t replace

this.

It

has

all

those memories and things that g0 along that don’t

And

a nicer ﬁshing knife.
that

was

care of a boat.

But

it’s all

this case is

it

makes me think of that.

more than just a

boat.

Insurance can take

those other things that were stolen.

You heard him
And he says

With 50 years 0f tackle that he’s collected.

about a tackle box
every time he’s told that story to

testify
it

every time Jeff [Majors] talks about his ﬁshing knife

stolen that his father gave him,

Because What was stolen in

come With even

me

too,

and he said

it

when he

testiﬁed, as if

something that everybody does, you go around and collect
never heard of somebody else doing this.
this is

But

it

was important

himself over these years.
(5/14/19 Tr., p.38, L.24

was an important memory
And that was just thrown away.

to him.

— p.40,

It

it

was a comment 0n

already heard the Victim explain—with language far

he created for

the evidence.

more sentimental than

The jury had

the prosecutor’s—the

theft:

You had some pretty special

Q.

I’ve

L.10.)

This statement was proper, ﬁrst, because

emotional impacts of the

that

tackle.

tackle

on the

boat, correct?

A

I

Q.

Can you tell me about that?

A

from When I was a little boy, 50 years 0f tackle.
As the water would recede from a lake, as a little boy, you’d go around and
pick up lures that were lodged in rocks and you would save them. And I
had a tackle box that meant a lot t0 me. I had—I’d say it was probably
1973. It was a tackle box I got from Kmart. And you could send in a little
index card and put your name on it, so it had my name embossed 0n this

did.

It’s

tackle that

I

collected

tackle box.

had just items that meant a lot t0 me, just like anyone Who has collected
something for a long time. There was a special knife and—

I

What was
A.

special about that knife?

had two knives. I was going to get t0 the very important knife. It
was called a—it was a buck light knife. And if you ever held it, you knew
Why it was called that name. It was a quality knife that my father gave me
in 2010. And then he passed away in 2012.
Well,

I
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So there were items 0n that boat that meant a lot to me that are gone. And
you know, disheartening, disturbing. There was also a knife that

that was,

my daughters

gave

— p.56,

L.7.)

(5/8/19 Tr., p.55, L.4

me

for Father’s Day.

Richardson had n0 objection to the Victim testifying about his
about collecting “50 years” worth 0f tackle that was later stolen;

how

own
it

childhood memories;

was “disheartening” and

“disturbing” that things that were “special” and “meant a lot t0 [him] were stolen”; and that the

stolen items included a knife

me

for Father’s

Day”

139 Idaho

at

it

and “a knife

The prosecutor’s

jury.

that

my daughters gave

A11 0f these statements

allusion to these statements

was a comment on evidence

that

was

had already been admitted.

therefore

Sheahan,

280, 77 P.3d at 969.

Beyond

that,

“inﬂammatory”

in

on events from

his

exhortation, Will

Richardson has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s statements were

any recognizable sense 0f the word. While the prosecutor admittedly touched

ambiguous remark

own
to

life,

have

draw

appellate courts Will not “lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an

its

that

most damaging meaning or

would not have

only be described,

that a jury, sitting through lengthy

meaning from the plethora of

And even

Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439.

the elderly

father,

(E 5/8/19 TL, p.55, L.4 — p.56, L.7.)

to boot.

were evidence before the
appropriate, because

from his since-deceased

their heartstrings

at worst, as a

the

tugged—much

less

damaging

interpretations.”

most diehard ﬁsherman or friend of
less passions

aroused—by what can

sappy story about the prosecutor being a bad ﬁsherman and

ﬁshing with his grandfather. Nor does Richardson come close t0 showing the closing statement
“‘so infected the

trial

with unfairness as to

process.” Lankford, 162 Idaho

at

make

497, 399 P.3d
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at

the resulting conviction a denial of due

824 (quoting Darden, 477 U.S.

at 181).

As

such, Richardson fails t0

show

the statements

were made

error,

much

less that they

amounted a

clear constitutional Violation.

Alternatively, even assuming Richardson can

his grandfather’s knife in closing, Richardson fails t0

to

show

no way

a Violation that

is

clear

show

the prosecutor erred

and obvious from the record. Richardson presumes

that failing t0 object could

must

This conclusory argument

be interpreted as a

fails to satisfy

strategic decision

Pﬂ’s

m,

165 Idaho

at 119,

443 P.3d

at

made

that “there is

on the part of

(Appellant’s brief,

133 (emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]f the record
strategic, the

claim

and thus more appropriately addressed Via a petition for post-conviction

(emphasis added).

Because Richardson does not even argue there

showing “whether or not

trial

counsel

factbound question, insufﬁcient t0 meet

Finally,

Richardson

made

trial

a tactical decision in failing t0

does not contain evidence regarding whether counsel’s decision was
in nature

is so.

fails

second prong, which holds “the record

also contain evidence as t0 Whether 0r not trial counsel

object.”

talking about

meet Piry’s second prong, because he

counsel,” Without pointing to any evidence in the record that shows this

p.9.)

by

is

is

factual

relief.”

Li.

evidence in the record

a tactical decision in failing to object,” this

is

a

Pig’s second prong.

even assuming the prosecutor engaged in clear and obvious misconduct,

fails to satisfy

Pﬂ’s third prong.

The Idaho Supreme Court recently clariﬁed

“that

the third prong 0f Perry requires that the defendant demonstrate that the clear error in the

record—i.e., the error identiﬁed in the ﬁrst and second prongs—actually affected the outcome 0f
the trial proceedings.”

only

that,

m,

165 Idaho

at

119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34 (emphasis added).

but the “[W]hether the error affected the

the appellate record.” Li.

As

trial

proceedings” must

itself

Not

“be clear from

a result, defendants can no longer rely on claiming an error simply

19

had a “reasonable

of affecting the trial—that lower standard

possibility”

is

“no longer appropriate

0r descriptive of the third prong ofPerry.” Li. at 120, 443 P.3d at 134.

Here, there

is

n0 evidence showing the prosecutor’s closing remarks had any

The

verdict whatsoever.

had a strong case against Richardson,

state

Moreover, “prosecutorial misconduct does not
instruction

is

rise t0 the level

given t0 the jury indicating that statements

argument are not evidence.” Li

were correctly told

that “the

at 125,

443 P.3d

at 139.

effect

0n the

as outlined herein.

0f fundamental error when an

made by

the attorneys during closing

The jury here was so

instructed: they

arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence,” that

“lawyers are not Witnesses,” and that What lawyers “say in their opening statements” and “closing
statements

is

p.30, Ls.5-11.)

Idaho

at 122,

On

included t0 help you interpret the evidence but

Once

443 P.3d

again,

we

it is

not evidence.” (5/14/19 TL,

“presume[] the jury followed” these instructions.

remarks actually affected the jury verdict.

outcome 0f the

was
was

trial

165

at 136.

appeal Richardson does not even attempt t0 meet his burden to

possibility” standard

m,

still

his burden;

likely affected

Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13 (emphasis).)

Richardson argues as

show

if the

the prosecutor’s

old “reasonable

he simply assumes, in conclusory fashion, that “the

by the prosecutor’s inﬂammatory language.”
But even going along with

this premise,

(m

and granting

arguendo the outcome was “likely affected”—despite no evidence showing even that—
Richardson misses the mark.
actually aﬂected the

Idaho

at 120,

Richardson does not show, or even try t0 argue, that any error

proceedings—which he must do

443 P.3d

at 134.

As

such, his claim

20

fails.

to

show fundamental

error.

m,

165

III.

Richardson Fails T0

Show The

Richardson’s ﬁnal claim

new

trial,

District

is

Court Erred In Denying His Motion For

that the district court, “ruling

failed to act within the boundaries

legal standard

When

it

instruction to the jury.”

of

its

discretion

0n the Defendant’s motion

He

for

and consistent with the applicable

failed t0 recognize the timeliness requirement

(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)

A New Trial

0f giving a curative

elaborates that “[t]his led t0 the Trial

Court’s erroneous conclusion that failing t0 strike impermissible testimony and give a timely

curative instruction

was remedied by giving a ﬁnal

written jury instruction four days later.” (Id.)

This claim essentially just rehashes Richardson’s mistrial arguments.

herein,

and as the

merits.

As

district court correctly

such, Richardson fails t0

show

determined

But as explained

(R., pp.161-62), these claims fail

0n the

the district court erred in denying his motion for a

trial.

21

new

CONCLUSION
The

state

respectfully requests this Court

Richardson’s motion for a

DATED this

afﬁrm the

district

court’s

order denying

new trial, and afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

16th day of July, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans
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Deputy Attorney General
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